By Harold H. Oliver (auth.)
C. S. Peirce's indictment that "the leader reason behind [metaphysics'] backward is that its prime professors were theo (Collected Papers 6:3) falls seriously at my door. For it logians" used to be out of mirrored image upon spiritual event and its which means that the current relational metaphysic used to be conceived. My desire, despite the fact that, is that its scope is satisfactorily wider than its theological origins to justify its visual appeal as a piece in philosophy. Having been nurtured in existential philosophy and having reached a few degree of adulthood with the clever assistance of Professor Dr. Fritz Buri, of Basel, I got here to consider that theology as a contemporary self-discipline had reached an deadlock as a result of its overextended commitments to a subject-object paradigm of notion. Even these theologians who despaired of those ties appeared not able to discover an self reliant substitute idiom for his or her principles. A moment stress in my pondering resulted from the inordinate overlook via theologians of the flora and fauna. additionally, my typical curiosity in actual figuring out appeared unfulfilled in the slender confines of theology, even of philosophical theology as then practiced. As I grew to become decisively towards the examine of recent physics, and particularly of cosmology, a brand new international appeared to divulge heart's contents to me. After huge examine with favourite astronomers and physicists, it all started to sunrise on me that the hot physics has devised conceptual paradigms of idea that could be generalized right into a metaphysical approach of common interest.
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The vintage belief of human transcendental cognizance assumes its self-supporting existential prestige in the horizon of life-world, nature and earth. but this assumed absoluteness doesn't entail the character of its powers, neither their constitutive strength. This latter demand an existential resource achieving past the generative life-world community.
1 technology and man
2 technological know-how and phenomenology
3 The plan of this work
4 'Geographical phenomenology'
5 The disciplinary context
PART I GEOGRAPHY and standard METAPHYSICS
Geographical discourse and its vital themes
6 simple suggestions of technology and the strategy acceptable to ontology
7 Objectivism and subjectivism
8 Positivism and naturalism
8a The a-historical nature of positivism
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PART II GEOGRAPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY
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PART III PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE query OF HUMAN SCIENCE
Husserlian phenomenology: the foundational project
23 what's phenomenology?
23a Phenomenology: its origins and foundations
23b The usual attitude
23c Empirical technological know-how and natural science
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24 the necessity for phenomenology
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24b The critique of the optimistic sciences
24c The constitution of the realm and 'objects' of science
24d Phenomenology and the guiding thought of science
Phenomenology, technological know-how and phenomenological geography
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26 Phenomenology, technological know-how and lifeworld
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26d Lifeworld and transcendental phenomenology
Towards a primary ontology of science
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PART IV HUMAN technology, WORLDHOOD, AND SPATIALITY
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Extra info for A Relational Metaphysic
Kant's Pre-critical Philosophy There is always a certain measure of risk in dividing a scholar's sustained creative efforts into periods, for the continuity is likely to be minimized. At the same time, creativity commonly denotes a movement in which certain discontinuities will occur. Nevertheless, Kant affords a justification for making a distinction between his pre-critical and critical periods; for in 1769, after many publications in physics and philosophy, he spoke of "a great light that dawned upon him" as he struggled with the question of the structure of space.
I t seems that the more one takes into account the discussion with Leibniz, the less significant becomes the question of Newton. This is so, not because Kant rejected Newtonian ideas about mechanics, but rather because he (ilnd his contemporaries) did not see the problem which these ideas posed for his overall philosophical activity. This was his "dogmatic slumber" from which he was awakened, viz. when Newton's ideas became problematical. At the only time that Kant saw that he must choose between Leibniz and Newton prior to his Critique, he tended to favor 30 A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC Newton.
It could even be argued with some merit that the antinomies arise when the attempt is made to extend the validity of these laws to the realm of the things-in-themselves or, conversely, to extend the ontological claims valid for the things-in-themselves to the sphere of the phenomena, or Nature. " Kant shares much of the responsibility for the view so common in the nineteenth century that all physics is mechIilnics. 107 That is to say, nature for Kant is Nature "according to law," for which there is only one possible model, viz.
A Relational Metaphysic by Harold H. Oliver (auth.)