By Lee Hardy (auth.), Lee Hardy, Lester Embree (eds.)
Contemporaryphilosophyseems a superb swirling virtually chaos. each state of affairs needs to appear so on the time, most likely simply because philosophy itself resists structura tion and since own and political components inside of in addition to with no the self-discipline needs to fade to ensure that the certainly philosophical advantages of performances to be assessed. however, a few comments can nonetheless be made to situate the current quantity. for instance, a minimum of half philosophy on planet Earth is at the present time pursued in North the USA (which isn't to claim that this element is any much less internally incoherent than the total of which it hence turns into the most important half) and the current quantity is North American. (Incidentally, the popularity of culturally geographic traditions and trends nowise signifies that striving for cross-culturalif now not trans-cultural philosophical validity has failed or ceased. relatively, it in simple terms acknowledges an important point appropriate from the historic element of view.) Episte- Aesthetics Ethics and so forth. mology Analytic Philosophy Marxism Existentialism and so forth. determine 1. There are major ways that philosophical advancements are categorized. One is by way of developments, events, and faculties of concept and the opposite is by way of conventional sub-disciplines. while there's little rivalry between colleges, the major manner is by way of sub-disciplines, akin to aesthetics, ethics, politics, and so forth. this present day this mode of type will be obvious to intersect with that during phrases of routine and traits, either one of that are represented within the above chart.
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The vintage belief of human transcendental cognizance assumes its self-supporting existential prestige in the horizon of life-world, nature and earth. but this assumed absoluteness doesn't entail the character of its powers, neither their constitutive strength. This latter demand an existential resource achieving past the generative life-world community.
1 technological know-how and man
2 technological know-how and phenomenology
3 The plan of this work
4 'Geographical phenomenology'
5 The disciplinary context
PART I GEOGRAPHY and standard METAPHYSICS
Geographical discourse and its imperative themes
6 simple suggestions of technological know-how and the tactic acceptable to ontology
7 Objectivism and subjectivism
8 Positivism and naturalism
8a The a-historical nature of positivism
8b The Enlightenment and positivism
8c Naturalism and idealism
9 Kantian ontology of fabric nature
10 Conceptions of actual house and geography
10a The emergence of geography as an summary, theoretical science
10b Social physics
11 actual house, cognitive behaviouralism and the flip to subjectivity
12 The mode of being attribute of geographical objects
PART II GEOGRAPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY
The interpretation of phenomenology in geography
13 The phenomenological foundation of geography
14 Geographical phenomenology
14a Phenomenology and useful research
15 techniques to geographical phenomenology
15a the required contrast among humanism and geography
16 The view of science
16a Phenomenology as criticism
16b Phenomenology as anti-science
16c The foundational function of phenomenology
16d Phenomena of lived experience
17 The flip to the lifeworld, and the anomaly of flooring and object
18 The phenomenological method
Geographical phenomenology: a critique of its foundations
19 The metaphysics of geographical phenomenology
20 Humanism and the confusion of the 'objective' and the 'subjective'
20a Subjectivity and intentionality
20c The 'things themselves', 'consciousness' and 'the challenge of the target world'
21 Geographical phenomenology: its inner critique
21a Phenomenology and standards of validity
22 The flip to Schiitz's constitutive phenomenology and justifying a go back to Husserl
PART III PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE query OF HUMAN SCIENCE
Husserlian phenomenology: the foundational project
23 what's phenomenology?
23a Phenomenology: its origins and foundations
23b The ordinary attitude
23c Empirical technological know-how and natural science
23d unique intuition
23c Phenomena and intentionality
24 the necessity for phenomenology
24a The obstacle of distance among technological know-how and life
24b The critique of the confident sciences
24c The constitution of the realm and 'objects' of science
24d Phenomenology and the guiding concept of science
Phenomenology, technological know-how and phenomenological geography
25 Descriptive phenomenology and science
25a Sciences of truth and sciences of essence
25b Descriptive phenomenology
26 Phenomenology, technological know-how and lifeworld
26a The lifeworld ontology
26b The sciences and the lifeworld
26c The technological know-how of the lifeworld
26d Lifeworld and transcendental phenomenology
Towards a primary ontology of science
27 Phenomenology and a primary ontology of science
28 technology and objectivation in geography
28a How does theoretical discovery arise?
28b the standard global and the theoretical attitude
29 the advance of technological know-how and the concept that of 'progress'
30 Human technology and objectification
31 Rigour and exactitude in science
32 thought and its achieve and carry over nature and world
33 technological know-how and the lived world
PART IV HUMAN technology, WORLDHOOD, AND SPATIALITY
Implications for the human sciences and a human technological know-how of geography
35 Phenomenology and the technology of geography
36 in the direction of a proper projective human science
37 Husserl and human science
38 in the direction of a proper and a priori 'mathesis of spiritand of humanity'
39 The existential analytic and the human sciences
40 The existential analytic and the 'natural perception of the world' (or lifeworld)
Towards an figuring out of human spatiality
41 Geography, international and space
42 global and worldhood
43a The technological view of space
43b The spatiality of the present-at-hand
44 the typical mode of being-in-the-world
45 The spatiality of the ready-to-hand: areas and regions
46 house and science
47 Man's spatiality
48 area and man's spatiality
49 position and area: implications for a local ontology of spatiality for a geographical human technology
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Additional resources for Phenomenology of Natural Science
117 '" FTI, 279/H XVII, 246. us FIL 128-129IH XVII, 114. 116 eM, 12JH I, 53. '" FTI, 288/H XVII, 294; emphasis deleted. SCIENCE IN HUSSERL AND THE TRADITION 33 X. Conclusion Husserl's philosophy of science has often been faulted as dogmatic, unduly informed by a foundationalist epistemology. We found such charges to be unjustified on two counts. First, although Husserl was throughout his career an adherent of the strong foundationalist account of science, he limited the validity of that account to the purely deductive sciences.
They will never count as bodies of knowledge in the strict sense; although, as bodies of belief, they may be perfectly rational. The main reason why the natural sciences fall short of knowledge is that natural bodies are, for Locke, collocations of simple ideas between which we so Essay, IV,ii, 6. " Essay, IV,xiv,1. 52 Essay, IV,xv,5. SCIENCE IN HUSSERL AND THE TRADITION 17 can intuit no necessary relations. This is because the simple ideas composing the naturalsubstances-secondaryqualities for the most part-are dependent upon the primary qualities of the imperceptible material parts of natural substances.
It is not to show that the fact itself is necessary, but only that it necessarily follows from certain given antecedent conditions. What is necessary is not the consequent, but the consequence. The diagonal between the opposite corners of my desk just happens to be ofa certain length. It could have been otherwise. Its being that length is a wholly contingent matter. But, given that the corners of my desk are right angles together with the length of its sides, it necessarily follows that the length of the diagonal is precisely what it happens to be; it does not follow, however, that the diagonal is necessarily that length.
Phenomenology of Natural Science by Lee Hardy (auth.), Lee Hardy, Lester Embree (eds.)